The Future of Intelligence Studies by Glees, Anthony
Journal of Strategic
Security
Volume 6
Number 5 Volume 6, No. 3, Fall 2013
Supplement: Ninth Annual IAFIE
Conference: Expanding the Frontiers
of Intelligence Education
Article 15
The Future of Intelligence
Studies
Anthony Glees
Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies at the University of Buckingham (BUCSIS)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss
pp. 124-127
This Papers is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Glees, Anthony. "The Future of Intelligence Studies." Journal of Strategic
Security 6, no. 3 Suppl. (2013): 124-127.
124 
 
The Future of Intelligence Studies 
 
Anthony Glees 
Director of the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies at the University of Buckingham 
(BUCSIS) 
 
This paper seeks to stimulate debate on the following themes: 
 
Pedagogical Approaches to the Teaching of Intelligence Studies 
The Nexus between Intelligence Education and Intelligence Training 
The Role of Intelligence Education in Developing the Profession 
 
Broadly, it’s my feeling that Intelligence Studies, and within them two critical questions, 
namely how and what is taught, and to whom, have reached a critical juncture in the UK, at 
any rate. The importance of the field and the strong level of home and international student 
interest in it have never been easier to establish.  
 
As far as ‘how and what’ are concerned, in the past few years the UK has seen the 
publication of two authorized histories of secret agencies by Christopher Andrew and Keith 
Jeffery (MI5 and MI6), and the media have ensured that most thinking people now 
understand that a large amount of our national political activity today has a significant 
intelligence dimension. This comes perhaps because so much policy is intelligence-led or 
perhaps because public concern about, and interest in, the work of our intelligence agencies is 
far greater than at any time for the past twenty five years. But it is worth reflecting that the 
issue of ‘what’ also raises the question whether the primary focus of any higher education 
programme should be on a single national model, or several models. At the University of 
Buckingham we focus chiefly on the British intelligence model because we think, no doubt 
arrogantly, that it is not only best but also because it is of appeal to international students 
especially those from countries where, in the past, Britain had a colonial presence. 
 
As far as ‘to whom’ intelligence education is provided, it is plain that this, too, has become an 
issue more openly debated. In the second half of 2012, for example, the British media gave 
prominence to a new ‘apprenticeship scheme’ as a trawl for recruits to our secret agencies 
(the Government’s Communications Centre, GCHQ, was both the prime mover and intended 
chief beneficiary).1 It raised the issue (well known to those who study ‘Q’) as to whether the 
best intelligence officers are graduates (the ‘best and the brightest’) or, in an era where cyber 
security is increasingly a problem, whether it would be smarter to go for eighteen year old 
‘geeks’ who play computer games and know a thing or two about hacking. They’d be cheaper 
than graduates to boot. But MI6 also raised eyebrows with a very cleverly worded 
advertisement in Britain’s main newspapers for two weeks running (timed to coincide with 
the release of the latest James Bond movie) indicating that they were after all sorts of 
different recruits.2 Finally, slightly out of the public eye, Lockheed-Martin launched its 
‘Dungarvan’ project with the Mercyhurst College’s intelligence studies department 
(Mercyhurst is a Catholic university in the USA) in a bid to provide no frills intelligence 
‘training’, clearly aimed at police intelligence operatives throughout the European Union 
whom the organisers feel do not need ‘education’ but simply ‘instruction’, most provided, it 
                                                             
1
 http://www.channel4.com/news/scheme-to-lure-x-box-generation-into-code-breaking-careers 
2
 https://www.sis.gov.uk/careers/roles/intelligence-officers.html 
Glees: The Future of Intelligence Studies
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
125 
 
would appear, by former middle-ranking FBI practitioners .3  It’s easier to study the subject 
than it has ever been and students can choose whether they want to learn from those who 
have researched the subject but never been near a secret agency, or those who have worked 
for an agency but never done any serious research, or, indeed, from a mixture of both.  
 
Several questions are hereby begged, critical to Britain’s intelligence community as it 
prepares to meet the challenges of the third decade of the 21st Century. What does 
intelligence education need to consist of? To whom – and by whom – should it be provided? 
If ‘training’ rather than ‘education’ is the thing of the future, will that not make the most 
important and mind-developing aspects of intelligence studies redundant? Will not research 
suffer with a knock-on impact on advanced teaching? Should intelligence professionals be 
‘trained’ to deploy specific ‘skills’ or should they be selected from the best and brightest, 
‘educated’ and required to use their talents along with acquired skills to serve their nations 
and their liberties best in the future? 
 
This broad set of questions mirrors an inherent (but I think highly productive) tension in the 
higher education field: whether the purpose of studying it is to educate intelligence students 
through research-led teaching to understand the subject and profit from it in a general way, or 
whether it is the purpose of higher education is to train the intelligence professionals of the 
future. I realise there is a difference here too between the UK and the USA where training is, 
understandably, a more significant deliverable than it is in a country like the UK (where the 
agencies recruit those they regard as best suited to the work and do their own training). 
Except that it is not as simple as that: apart from the recent interest in non-graduate eighteen 
year old apprentices, there is strong if for obvious reasons anecdotal evidence to suggest that 
postgraduate degrees in intelligence studies can be a pathway into the profession of 
intelligence officer. 
 
My own insights, such as they are, are based on a decade’s stated experience in teaching the 
subject, first at Brunel University and since 2008 at the University of Buckingham. Our 
baseline position at Buckingham is plain enough: we take good students who are interested in 
the subject, students who want careers in the field and those already in the field who believe 
they will benefit professionally from being skilled up as they would see it, in academe. By the 
same token we believe that intelligence work in the UK should be fully professionalised and 
that this would lead to better delivery and greater public confidence. We are trying to do what 
we can to progress this and finding some support for the idea. We have a strong outreach 
programme, having instructed those involved with intelligence-led activity in the police, the 
agencies and in government. 
 
Thinking about this matter raises a related one: the role within it of practitioners. It is a fact 
that practitioner input (which I welcome and strongly support) has not merely been absolutely 
vital but also, paradoxically, that it has not always been healthy. Sometimes former 
practitioners can claim ownership of an aspect of the subject and can perhaps inadvertently 
stifle discussion on the grounds that they know the truth and that is that. This was, perhaps, 
more of a problem in British intelligence studies forty years ago than it is today when such 
people could make or break those writing about it. I always reflect on the fact that two of my 
closest colleagues here at Buckingham have been practitioners but have repeatedly said that 
they only really understood what it was they had been part of once they had left their services 
and were able to look critically at them from the outside. 
                                                             
3
 http://www.mercyhurst.edu/dungarvancenter/ 
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In short, a way forward must now be found to make a coherent case for the development of 
intelligence studies that is about ‘education’ and not simply ‘training’, firmly rooted in the 
traditional tasks of higher education (rather than secondary or further education). Whilst the 
imposition of a new subject orthodoxy on others should be resisted, we need to encourage 
new minds to work in this field in new ways, and to discourage colleagues from sticking too 
strongly to their existing areas of study, prompting them instead (via the offer of publication) 
to tackle new themes and problems. Diversity and innovation cause a subject to blossom; 
orthodoxy and arrogance cause it to wither.  
 
The principal debates in intelligence studies are currently concerned largely with the 
following issues: the political accountability and the political oversight of secret intelligence 
agencies, their accountability and their competence in terms of tradecraft, political skills and 
ethical values (accountability and competence feed into each other). In my view, recent 
examples in the UK show that in the UK there are currently very major problems in respect 
of making covert action accountable.  
 
As far as intelligence history is concerned, this remains a vital area but I am not sure that the 
principal debates here are making much headway in terms of their impact on scholarly (and 
non-scholarly) thinking about the real history of covert intelligence-led activity and its real 
impact on the history of politics.  
 
I was not keen on the way in which the 'authorized' histories of MI5 and MI6 were produced 
(I believe that the secret agencies should not use patronage but either have established a 
committee of historians to examine whatever materials could be supplied to them) or that the 
documentary evidence should be placed in the public domain, allowing as many historians as 
possible to sift the evidence and present their findings in the normal way, free of any 
suggestion that the version they produce was 'authorized' by any government agency.  
 
That said, Christopher Andrew (the beneficiary of three major projects put his way by the 
powers that be – telling the stories of Gordievsky, Mitrokhin and then of MI5 itself) has 
always been scrupulous in putting documents he's seen into the public domain wherever 
possible and speedily too (e.g. over Klaus Fuchs).  
 
But there is are interesting and important debates which never take place because of the 
lacunae, deliberate or accidental, in writing the histories of our secret agencies (e.g. the 
complete lack of any authorized account of the penetration of UK intelligence by Communist 
agents in the Second World War period or the relationship between the UK’s secret agencies 
and the media). There has also been at least one serious allegation by a scholar of bias in the 
authorized history of MI5 (reported in Intelligence and National Security). 
 
Perhaps the most over-researched area of intelligence studies has to do with the intelligence 
cycle and how it might be modified. I'd point to the latest issue of INS (April 2012) as a case 
in point (and I emphasise that you are doing me the great courtesy of asking my opinion, I'm 
not pressing it on you unasked!). Almost all of the articles which seek to schematize the 
business of objective analysis (yet always somewhere display a bias along the way) are, I 
find, dull and backward-looking. I also have pedagogical problems with this approach 
because in my own view if we are to get the best intelligence professionals possible, we need 
to encourage them to think creatively as well as systematically and that means avoiding at all 
costs ‘box ticking’ forms of analysis. 
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Part of the problem here, it seems to me, has been the lack of evidence with which scholars 
can get to grips. This may have led to over-theorization (there is a parallel here with Political 
Science and the study of International Relations more generally which has taken the subject 
away from the meaningful analysis of real political problems, and away from doing social 
good, into a narcissistic fascination with theories that have little if anything to do with real 
life politics).  
 
I would say we need in the UK to ask more difficult questions about why we are not provided 
with more data from which to work (our Cabinet Office has shown over the past two years 
that it understands the question well enough, but it's equally plain it is not in a position to 
move forward). As far as our secret institutions are concerned, I believe we need to know far 
more about them and that there is no national disadvantage in our being allowed to do so. I 
believe, too, we ought to know far more about the activities of our secret agencies in third 
world countries, especially, perhaps Africa. 
 
The question as to whether the relationships are good between those who study intelligence 
and those who make policy which is intelligence-led (where we are speaking about policy-
makers in non-secret institutions) is a key one. In the UK these can be strong but always in a 
peculiarly British and non-institutionalised way. Ever since I started out as a doctoral student 
at Oxford University forty years ago I've had no great difficulty in speaking and engaging 
with those who have been involved or are involved in policy which is intelligence-led, or has 
a strong intelligence component. This is true whether the subject is historical (e.g. 
Communist subversion in the 1930s, 40s and 1950s) or political (e.g. counter-terrorism policy 
and counter-radicalisation policy). 
 
Is there, in the UK, a good relationship between those who study intelligence and those 
actually doing intelligence work, I’d say ‘yes’, more than one might think as long as 
questions related to current operations are avoided as indeed they should be. Certainly we at 
Buckingham do have outreach to various institutions as and when this is appropriate (which 
is decided by them, not us). I know that we are not unique. Where this exists, then it is an 
important resource both to help scholars frame and refine their investigations and, hopefully, 
to impact on practitioners where appropriate. 
 
The greatest challenge for intelligence studies is to surmount intellectual isolation by working 
together more systematically and less hierarchically – more workshops, more study groups, 
fewer large showcasing conferences.  
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